REGULATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES THROUGH: LIMITATION RIDERS
NEAL E. DEVINS*
Congress often attaches limitation riders to appropriations bills to establish its policy directives. Professor Devins argues that the appropriations process is not the proper vehicle for substantive policymaking. In this article, he analyzes institutional characteristics that prevent the full consideration or articulation of policy in appropriations bills. Professor Devins also considers the extent to which Congress's use of limitation riders inhibits the effectiveness of the other branches of the federal government. Professor Devins concludes that, while Congress's use of limitation riders is sometimes necessary, Congress should be aware of the significant risks associated with po!icymaking through the appropriations process.
Over the past decade, Congress has increasingly relied on the appropriations process to establish its policy directives. 1 Congressional oversight of the executive and independent agencies, as well as substantive policy initiatives, are often the product of funding decisions and so-called limitation riders 2 attached to appropriations bills. Indeed, some of Congress's most controversial policy directives result from the appropriations process. In 1986, for example, Congress threatened to cut off funds to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulatory review operations, pressuring OMB into modifying its highly controversial practice of subjecting proposed regulations to a cost-benefit analysis. 3 Congress also [Vol. 1987:456 sons. House and Senate rules reflect this concern, attempting to separate the process of funding from other lawmaking processes. 12 These rules are a sensible means of ensuring that congressional decisionmaking is deliberate and systematic. 'The use of the appropriations process to accomplish substantive objectives that have not been considered previously or that contravene established statutory objectives may prevent the appropriate authorizing committee from applying its expertise. 13 Exacerbating this problem, appropriations are often acted on quickly, providing little opportunity for thoughtful deliberation of the issues raised by such measures. 14 In addition to these institutional concerns, appropriations-based policymaking may strain the effectiveness of the other branches of the federal government. For example, courts called upon to give effect to limitation riders are placed in an untenable positiqn. Because most appropriations are restricted to a specific time period (usually a single fiscal year), 15 the purposes for which they are enacted may vary with changed circumstances. Limitation riders may serve only as temporary stop-gap measures, enabling Congress to review proposed executive action before it becomes effective. On the other hand, Congress may reenact a rider several times to establish its view as to how an authorizations statute should be interpreted. Court interpretations of limitation riders as amendments to previously ~:nacted legislation, therefore, are inherently unreliable; they may be accurate one day, inaccurate the next, and irrelevant at the end of the fiscal year.
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Furthermore, riders that prohibit the Executive from launching regulatory initiatives-without altering the underlying authorizations statute-unduly limit the Executive's policymaking responsibilities. 16 While its power of the purse generally allows for such interference, Congress 12. House Rule XXI, clauses 2 and 5, and Senate Rule XVI, clauses 2 and 4, bar legislation in a geneml appropriations bill. House Rule XXI, cis. 2 and 5, H.R. Doc. No. 403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 525-40, 541-43 (1979) (96th Congress preamble printed over 95th Congress, 2d Session document); Senate Rule XVI, cis. 2 and 4, S. Doc. No. I, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1977) . Both chambers, however, have adopted rules which recognize the prevalence of legislation in an appropriation. House Rule XXI, clause 3, requires reports accompanying appropriations bills to "contain a concise statement describing fully the effect of any provision ... which directly or indirectly changes the application of existing law." House Rule XXI, supra at 540. Senate Rule XVI, clause 8, requires the identification of each recommended appropriation that does not "carry out the provisions of an existing Jaw .••. " Senate Rule XVI, supra at 19.
13. See gellera/ly Parnell, Co11gressiona/ Imerfere/lce i11 Age11cy Enforcement: The IRS Experie/lce, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1375-77 (1980) (discussing prudential considemtions of preventing administmtive agencies from exercising expe11ise).
14. See i11jra note 58 and accompanying text. IS. Parnell, supra note 13, at 1376. 16. See i11jra notes 100-115 and accompanying text. In the view of some commentators, such infringement is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. E.g., ParnelJ, supra note should accord due deference to executive enforcement schemes; otherwise, the enforcement schemes are likely to become a confusing patchwork, with some provisions vigorously enforced while others are virtually ignored.
In a sense, the dangers of legislating and regulating through appropriations are symptomatic of Congress's inability to enact authorizing legislation. 17 This failure has blurred the line between appropriations and authorizations. Moreover, in this age of budget deficits, it is likely that Congress will place less emphasis on authorization measures. 18 Instead, Congress will make greater use of appropriations and other devices to ensure that agency operations reflect the legislative will.
Part I of this article considers the prevalence and risks of limitation riders. 19 This discussion emphasizes that, as a means to establish public policy, the appropriations process is incomplete and the implementation of limitation riders is plagued by practi~l problems. Part II evaluates the constitutionality of such riders. 20 Specific attention is paid to whether Congress has plenary authority to limit either executive enforcement or federal court jurisdiction through budgetary constraints. This analysis reveals that Congress has such authority, provided that it does not command the Executive or the courts to undertake constitutionally proscribed activities. Part III addresses the issue of whether courts should view limitation riders as amendments to related authorizing legislation.21 This section argues that, because of the inherently transient nature of such measures, riders should not be viewed in this manner.
While highly critical of appropriations-based policymaking, this article is not intended to serve as a rallying call for the termination of this practice. On occasion, Congress will have no choice but to make policy through appropriations: legislative proposals may be stalled in authorizing committees or Congress may need to respond quickly to an emergency situation. At the same time, the risks of appropriations-based policymaking are such that Congress should not ignore the separate functions served by authorizations and appropriations. This article highlights these risks. 13 , at 1377-83. As discussed later, this constitutional claim is in error, for appropriations bills are as much legislation as are authorizations. See [Vol. 1987:456 
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I. APPROPRIATIONS AS OVERSIGHT
Congress's use of its appropriations powers as a policy device reflects Congress's penchant for oversight and the related decline of the authorizations process. Indeed, over the past several years, Congress has focused more on how much government funding a given group or cause should receive than directly on how existing or proposed programs benefit society. 22 Through this greater emphasis on the "purse strings" of government, Congress has not only attempted to check executive abuses; it also has asserted its authority over the other branches of government. 23 Oversight of executive organization and action is a traditional function of Congress. 24 Yet, this oversight role has moved into the forefront due to an "increasing tendency for legislatures to prescribe administrative organization, procedures, and programs in greater detail." 25 This heightened emphasis by Congress on supervising the enforcement of the laws has found support among various writers who claim that the whole of lawmaking authority is properly located in the legislative branch. One commentator suggests "that the congressional 'input' can and should become a more substantial and innovative one ... [due to] the President's 'priority problems, ' [and] the advantages of a decentralized and specialized Congress in publicizing a range of issues and developing and 'cumu- The United States is in the mids.t of a critical realignment in the power relationship between the legislative and the executive branches. In recent years, Congress has been increasingly reluctant to give executive and regulatory agencies carte blanche in carrying out the laws it had enacted. Congress senses that the life of the law is in its implementation. It has therefore sought to control administrative behavior by circumscribing the discretion of Federal agencies and by reserving to itself the authority to review administrative and regulatory policies. Congress asserts control over the administrative state through numerous statutory and nonstatutory measures. 28 The use of appropriations is only one of these oversight techniques, but an especially potent one. Unlike other types of oversight, which. for the most part. rely on the threat of direct action, appropriations are direct action. As the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs concluded:
Regulatory Reform Hearings
[A]ppropriations oversight is effective precisely because the statutory controls are so direct, unambiguous, and virtually self-enforcing. While agencies are able to bend the more ambiguous language of authorizing legislation to their own purposes, the dollar figures in appropriations bills represent commands which cannot be bent or ignored except at extreme peril to agency officials. 29 Because the Antideficiency Act compels the cessation of nonessential government operations if funding is not approved, 30 most appropriations must be enacted each year, making appropriations a likely mechanism of congressional oversight.
A. The Prevalence of Limitation Riders.
One of the most controversial and frequently used devices of appropriations-based oversight of executive action is the limitation rider. These riders are amendments to an appropriations bill which "prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose [ Congress has been attaching limitation riders to appropriations bills since the 1870s. 34 Nineteenth century riders involved war powers, federal supervision of elections, and extension of the Constitution and rev~ nue laws to territories. 35 By the 1940s, the use of riders was so widespread that the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress recommended that the practice of attaching legislation to appropriations bills be discontinued. 36 In the 1970s, the line separating authorizations from appropriations grew increasingly blurry. 37 The House had ample reason to be concerned. The use of appropriations to control executive actions had not been limited to one or two policy areas, but rather was extended to a wide range of subjects. For example, limitation riders for the 1979 fiscal year 40 prohibited the Department of Health, Education and Welfare from either funding abortions41 or requiring school systems to undertake mandatory student busing as a condition to receiving federal funds; 42 prohibited the Department of Transportation from using any funds to enforce any regulation which required a motor vehicle to be equipped with any kind of personal restraint system other than a seat belt; 43 prohibited the closing or relocation of military bases without prior notification to Congress; 44 and prohibited OSHA regulation of small businesses and firms. 45 Fiscal year 1979 riders were not an anomaly. In 1980, 861imitation riders (41% of all amendments) were offered; 67 were adopted. 46 The adopted riders included restrictions on nondiscriminaton enforcement by the IRS, Department of Education and the Department of Justice; OSHA enforcement of safety standards in small businesses; HUD financial assistance to student aliens; the distribution of government publications to Cuba, Iran and the USSR; and 50 Although it might be preferable for members of Congress to work through the proper authorizations committee, appropriations may be the only mechanism available to force consideration of certain issues.
Appropriations-based restrictions on agency action may also be the only realistic way to stop the Executive from launching administrative initiatives that Congress disfavors. There simply may not be sufficient time to work through the deliberative authorizations process. For example, when Congress prohibited the Internal Revenue Service from implementing its proposed nondiscrimination standards for private schools in 1979, the House Appropriations Committee contended that "the Service ought not issue these revenue procedures until the appropriate legislative committees have had a chance to evaluate them." 51 Were riders not used in this and like circumstances, Congress's power of the purse as well as its power to establish substantive policy would be undercut.
Appropriations-based policymaking may be useful, but there are strong reasons to caution against it. First, policy-based appropriations "generate[ ] 'vehement contention and debate' in the House and 'discord and dissension' between the House and the Senate." 52 Second, policymaking through the appropriations process is conducted without the benefit of review by the authorizing committee with appropriate subjected. Sept. 19, 1983) . Although these controversial proposals failed, their introduction further demonstrates that Congress frequently resorts to the appropriations process to resolve substantive policy issues. [Vol. 1987:456 C. The Hyde Amendments.
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The paradigmatic limitation riders-the series of Hyde amendments, which prohibit federal funding of abortions 59 -exemplify many of the problems encountered in appropriations-based oversight. In 1974, prior to enactment of the first Hyde amendment, Congress considered and rejected limitations on federal funding of abortions. At that time, the conference committee claimed that "an annual appropriation bill is an improper vehicle for such a controversial and far-reaching legislative provision whose implications and ramifications are not clear, whose constitutionality has been challenged, and on which no hearings have been held." 60 Despite consistent reenactment, 61 the Hyde amendments do not symbolize the prevalence of majority will over obstinate authorization committees. It is true that the amendments came to the House floor in part because opponents of abortion were unable to get a comparable measure out of committee. Yet, as Allen Schick noted in his study of appropriations-based oversight, the Senate, despite strong opposition, approved the first Hyde amendment to prevent the closing of key federal agencies. 62 The Hyde amendments travelled a tortuous road in becoming an ingrained part of the appropriations landscape. 63 As initially proposed, the first Hyde amendment would have prohibited the use of funds "to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. " 64 The Chair upheld a point of order on this: because the administrative agency took on a new duty by 59 63. Congress has accepted the Hyde amendment, as evidenced by the refusal of any member of the House to seek to defeat the anti-abortion rider under recently adopted procedures designed to further limit the attachment of legislation to an appropriations bill. See R. SACHS, supra note 39, at 25-26. In fact, Representative Henry Waxman, while urging defeat of the "usual Hyde amendment" because it "is out of order as . . . legislation on this appropriation bill," refused to utilize the new procedure. 129 CONG. REC. H7323 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1983 ascertaining whether the mother could safely carry the fetus to term, the amendment constituted legislation on an appropriations bill-a practice forbidden by House rules. 65 A point of order was also sustained on a subsequently offered amendment that would have prohibited funding "except where a physician has certified the abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother." 66 The Chair noted that, because some physicians are paid by the federal government, the proferred amendment still constituted legislation on an appropriations bill. 67 To avoid such problems, the amendment was modified: "None of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used to pay for abortions or to promote or encourage abortions."68 Representative Hyde, regretful that he had to omit the exception for therapeutic abortions, claimed that he was "forced into this position today by points of order." 6 9 Points of order often will be raised on such controversial measures. 70 The rule prohibiting legislation on appropriations, even if skirted, may therefore·prevent Congress from fully articulating its policy preference. Furthermore, as Walter Kravitz noted in his 1977 study of legislation in appropriations bills, "[t]hese constraints involve technicalities of interpretation that are not only frequently unpredictable but often irrelevant to the substantive merit of a proposal." 71
The Hyde amendments also typify the switch from multi-year authorization to single-year appropriations-based policy. Congress constantly has tinkered with the amendments' language.7 2 In 1977, the amendment excepted from its reach those situations in which "the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term." 73 The 1978 72. Other examples of congressional tinkering include limitation riders passed to limit agencymandated busing and to curtail IRS nondiscrimination enforcement. A discussion of the antibusing rider can be found in C. DALE, supra note 10, at 20-22. For a discussion of the IRS rider, see infra [Vol. 1987:456 performed if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, if the life of the mother was endangered, or if "severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term." 74 The 1980 and 1981 amendments omitted the exception for severe and long-lasting physical health impairment.7 5 Although the singleyear nature of appropriations affords Congress the luxury of fine tuning, it also forces Congress to address this acrimonious issue each fiscal year. Furthermore, the annual changes inherent in appropriations-based policy create a moving target for courts to interpret, and frustrate executive branch efforts to develop a long-term enforcement structure. 76 The disruption caused by the Hyde amendments also demonstrates the potentially debilitating effect appropriations-based policy initiatives can have on Congress's ability to perform essential legislative functions. Debate over the fiscal year (FY) 1977 rider lasted eleven weeks, with dozens of compromise proposals on the fioor.7 7 The FY 1978 stalemate was worse, lasting more than five months. During the course of debate, twenty-eight separate votes were taken: seventeen in the Senate and eleven in the House.7 8 By the time the final bill was approved, two continuing resolutions had expired, and paychecks for employees of the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare were about to be delayed. 7 9 This disruption prompted an investigation by the Democratic Study Group and a spate of proposals to restrict the enactment of limitation riders. 80 Representative Hyde's amendment, however, was just the beginning. The use of limitation riders and other appropriations-based oversight devices has grown significantly in the decade since the first Hyde amendment was introduced.s 1
D. Obstacles to Appropriations-Based Policymaking.
Although the appropriations process continues to play a significant role in setting federal policy, increasing reliance on continuing resolutions, rather than discrete budget bills, and new House rules governing limitation amendments have significantly altered the manner in which 74 appropriations-based oversight is conducted. Continuing resolutions are adopted whenever Congress is unable to pass one or more of the regular appropriations bills. 82 Over the past few years, fiscal intransigency has been great, prompting the increased use of this budgetary device. As a result, the use of policy-based limitation riders has declined because the rule prohibiting legislation on an appropriation is applicable only when a regular appropriations bill is before Congress. 83 Another explanation for this decline is a July 1983 House rule which creates two obstacles to the adoption of limitation riders: (1) riders can only be considered after all other work on the bill has been completed; and (2) those opposing particular limitation riders can make a motion for the House to rise and report, requiring a majority of members to vote in favor of a rider's consideration. 84 Upon close examination, however, neither of these obstacles has diminished the use of appropriations-based oversight. Substantive legislation is often attached to continuing resolutions enacted in place of appropriations bills, resurrecting the limitation rider in another form. Furthermore, the new House rule frequently has proven little more than a detour to the enactment of riders.
Continuing resolutions are fast becoming a repository of last-minute legislation. A crude measure of growth is the length in pages of such resolutions. Prior to 1981, continuing resolutions uniformly were less than ten pages in length. 85 Over the past five years, each continuing resolution has been at least twice that length-the most notable of these being FY 1985's 363 page continuing resolution. 86 Many factors explain the transformation of continuing resolutions from stop-gap funding devices to mechanisms used to enact omnibus legislative measures. Under House rules, the bar against legislation in appropriations bills does not apply to continuing resolutions.87 More significantly, Congress is often unable to reach a consensus on regular appropriations bills, and because 82. These measures allow agencies and departments to continue operation until Congress enacts the regular appropriations. In some instances, however, Congress may use this device to fund an agency or department for an entire fiscal year. See [Vol. 1987:456 "the continuing resolution is approved 'at the last minute,' it h~s become an inviting vehicle for provisions which otherwise might not make it into law." 88 Over the past few years, Congress has considered several significant substantive measures in the hurlyburly of the continuing resolution process. The FY 1983 continuing resolution included restrictions on the procurement of imported goods by the Defense Department, rules for the disposal of federal lands and for exploration in wilderness areas, restrictions on legal assistance to aliens, and payments to state governments for federal programs. Like Congress's reliance on continuing resolutions, changes in House procedures governing the introduction of riders have not stemmed the tide of appropriations-based policymaking. In FY 1984, eleven policy-based riders were introduced on the House floor, six of which were adopted. 95 These riders limited the sanctions that can be imposed under the Clean Air Act, the direct or indirect use of federal funds to pay for abortions, and the restructudng of employee compensation practices. 96 During this process, not one limitation rider was defeated after a motion to rise was rejected. 97 In other words, the motion to rise is viewed as a substantive vote on the issue addressed by the rider; if the motion to rise fails, Congress will adopt the rider. legislation. 108 Congress's ability to set policy through appropriations was clearly demonstrated in the late 1960s and early 1970s when President Richard Nixon sought to frustrate congressional intent by spending less than Congress had appropriated for various social programs. 109 When beneficiaries of these programs challenged these "impoundments," the courts almost always ruled that Congress's power of the purse included the right to specify funding levels for governmental programs. 110 This principle dates back to an 1838 Supreme Court decision, Kendall v. United States ex rei. Stokes. 111 Holding that an officer of the Executive must expend funds in a manner consistent with legislative intent, the Court insisted:
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[I]t would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any right secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not the direction of the President. 112 Although Kendall and the 1970s impoundment cases concern executive refusal to expend appropriated funds, the reasoning of these decisions should extend to the converse situation in which Congress prohibits the President from launching enforcement initiatives by limiting the funds available for such purposes. 113 [Vol. 1987:456 specific constitutional demands, Congress's power to set spending priorities is as valid an exercise of legislative power as the decision to enact the affected authorization. As Justice Jackson stated in The Steel Seizure Case: 114 "While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army and navy to command." 115 The question then arises as to what types of appropriations-based restrictions are repugnant to the Constitution. The balance of this section is devoted to this question.
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B. The Obligation to Abide by the Constitution.
Appropriations acts, like other legislation, must comport with the Constitution. 116 Congress, therefore, cannot use its power of the purse to direct the President to violate the Constitution. For example, just as Congress cannot provide direct financial assistance to racially discriminatory institutions, 117 Congress-through denial of funds-cannot prevent the Executive from taking adequate steps to ensure that federal funds do not support invidious discrimination. 118 Indeed, in United States v. Lovett, 119 the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not punish named individuals for their political beliefs by prohibiting federal funds to be used in the payment of their salaries. The Court concluded that this appropriation 120 punished the individuals without a jury trial and therefore amounted to an unconstitutional bill of attainder. 1 2 1 The Court rejected the government's claim that "Congress under the Constitution has complete control over appropriations," 122 and ruled that the prohibition against bills of attainder "can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest 114 The new House rule may prove to be little more than a symbolic gesture. Indeed, House leaders have remarked that the rule does not prevent members from introducing, and voting on, appropriations measures dealing with controversial issues in which they had a strong interest. 98 Moreover, since the new rule only affects floor amendments, riders added in committee, on the Senate floor, in conference and orr continuing resolutions are not subject to this procedural obstacle.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF APPROPRIATIONS-BASED POLICY
The Constitution does not distinguish between Congress's power to appropriate funds and its other lawmaking powers. Article I, section 9 simply provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." 99 Thus, House and Senate rules prohibiting the attachment of authorizing legislation on an appropriations bill are properly viewed as a matter of congressional preference, not constitutional necessity. Critics of this use of appropriations, however, argue that in practice appropriations-based oversight might serve as an unconstitutional limitation on the Executive's article II duty to implement the law, on the Executive's obligation to abide by the Constitution, on the enforceability of federal court orders, and on federal court jurisdiction. Each of these charges is explored in this section.
A. Congressional Oversight and the Executive's Duty to Implement the
Law.
The Executive is constitutionally obligated to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 100 106. Of course, if such oversight is viewed as a substantive amendment to the underlying legislation, it would be implausible to argue that executive authority is undercut.
107. Parnell, supra note 13, at 1379. 126 The amendment prohibited HEW from requiring, "directly or indirectly, the transportation of any student to a school other than the school which is nearest the student's home" as a condition to its granting of funds to school districts with mandatory transportation plans. 127 The court of appeals rejected the claim that the Eagleton-Eiden amendment forced the government to fund dual school systems and upheld the amendment's restrictions. Noting that alternative enforcement mechanisms were available, the court ruled that Congress has the power to limit the executive branch's enforcement options in such circumstances. 128 The court, however, emphasized that " [d] istinct from its duty to enforce the law, the Executive must not itself participate in unlawful discrimination. . . . To avoid the cloud of constitutional doubt, we must assume that Congress did not intend the amendments to force federal financial support of illegal discrimination." 129 Taken together, these cases suggest that while Congress has broad authority both to limit and redefine the execution of the law, it is unconstitutional for Congress to direct the Executive to act in a manner forbidden by the Constitution. 142 were called upon to interpret a limitation rider that undercut the force of a prior order issued by the district court. The court order, an injunction freezing $250 million of FY 1983 and 1984 Education Department funds, was the by-product of the district court's effort to enforce the United States' obligation-undertaken in a consent decree-to assist the Chicago school board in financing its desegregation plan. 143 The district court refused to release the frozen funds despite a congressional appropriation of $20 million "to enable the Secretary of Education to comply with the consent decree." 144 In response to the district court's actions, Congress adopted the Weicker amendment, which stated that " . 1980 ). In Green, however, the issue of congressional authority over existing court orders was sidestepped. The district court ruled that riders on appropriations bills limiting IRS nondiscrimination enforcement did not serve as a bar to the court's enforcement of a permanent injunction against the Service. Indeed, the Green court ordered the Service to adopt standards clearly inconsistent with these limitations. In support of this reading, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pointed to legislative sponsors' statements that these riders did not "address the viability of court orders. [Vol. 1987:456 withheld from distribution to grantees because of the provisions of the [district court's] order."l4s
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The United States, claiming that Congress is empowered to clarify the purposes for which the money it appropriates is used, argued that this rider empowered the Secretary of Education to expend the frozen funds in whatever manner he deemed appropriate. 146 The school board argued otherwise, claiming that it would "destroy the finality and independence of judicial action" to allow Congress to retroactively effect a final judgment. 147 In ruling against the United States, the district court concluded, among other things, 148 that the doctrine of separation of powers prevents Congress from requiring a federal court to reverse-either directly or indirectly-a judgment against the United States. 149 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit signified its approval of this holding, although it did not explicitly rule on this matter.1so
The district court's approach is sound. 15 1 Once Congress enacts an appropriations bill, the Executive is free to obligate moneys within the parameters of its authority under pertinent statutes. 152 According to the district court, the Chicago consent decree required the Secretary of Education to provide the board with certain categories of available funds. 153 Consequently, when Congress enacted the Weicker amendment, the Secretary was already obligated-based on prior appropriations-to commit certain funds to the board. Congress, therefore, was no longer author- I 48. The district court, noting that Congress failed to pass a more restrictive rider that would not have allowed the Board to receive money in excess of the special $20 million appropriation, also rejected the United States' contention that the Weicker amendment limited its obligation under the consent decree. 588 F. Supp. at 231-33.
Id. at 234-35:
150. United States v. Board ofEduc., 744 F.2d 1300, 1305 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The government has wisely abandoned this position in i1s argument to this court.").
I 51. The consent decree, however, may well be invalid. By allowing one administration to tie its successor's hands on otherwise discretionary public policy determinations, the decree may well un- I 53. 588 F. Supp. at 2 I 1. There are possible separation of powers problems with this approach. If the appropriation was intended to cover a large number of projects and full satisfaction of a prior commitment has the effect of excluding most other expenditures, enforcement of a contingent funding commitment might thwart both legislative expectations and legislative control of the federal purse strings.
ized to make previously committed funds unavailable. Making funds unavailable would, in effect, both negate the court's authority to enforce the consent decree and the Executive's responsibility to comply with the decree by committing available funds. In short, with respect to appropriated funds already obligated, the district court's judgment was final. In contrast, with respect to funds not yet appropriated, the judgment was contingent upon future congressional appropriations. Since Congress cannot be forced to appropriate funds against its will, Congress could therefore restrict the amount of funds devoted to the consent decree in future appropriations.t54
D. Limitations on Federal Court Jurisdiction.
Limitation riders that limit federal court authority to fashion appropriate equitable relief may also be unconstitutional. Although Congress clearly has near-plenary authority to define available relief for the violation of statutory rights, 155 it is unclear whether Congress can prevent federal courts from issuing effective relief when constitutional rights are violated.
The Constitution grants Congress the right to restrict the scope of both Supreme Court and lower court jurisdiction. 156 Despite this broad grant of authority, many commentators and jurists have argued that the separation of powers doctrine prevents Congress from exercising this power in a manner that undercuts the courts' ability to effectively perform its constitutionally designated functions. 157 In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 158 the Supreme Court seemed to agree in principle, stating that "in determining whether [an] Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents [another] Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." 159 Consequently, if fashioning effective equitable relief is a function constitutionally assigned to the federal courts, congressional authority to restrict the courts' power to fashion such remedies may be limited. The Supreme Court, however, 154. In fact, Congress recently extended a prohibition against involving the federal government in any "obligation for the payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by has not definitively answered this question and commentators are bitterly divided on the subject.160 Federal courts have side-stepped this question when confronted with limitation riders that could-either by their own terms or in combination with other riders-be interpreted to limit the courts' authority to remedy the infringement of constitutional rights. In Wright v. Regan, 1 6 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to give substantive effect to a rider that could have been interpreted as a restriction on the federal courts' authority to order the Internal Revenue Service to launch constitutionally mandated nondiscrimination enforcement procedures. 162 The court of appeals, rejected this reading, noting that "[t]urbulent issues under our fundamental instrument of government would confront us were we to read the appropriations riders [in such a manner]."1 63 Another decision by the District of Columbia Circuit, Brown v. Califano, 164 also sheds light on this question. In upholding an antibusing restriction, the court emphasized that these riders did not limit the federal courts' remedial authority. Indeed, the court held that "[w]here a choice of alternative enforcement routes is available, and the one preferred is not demonstrably less effective, Congress has the power to exercise its preference."1 6 s These decisions, like the other cases discussed in this section, speak to the same proposition: appropriations are the constitutional equivalent of authorizations. Questions regarding Congress's authority to limit federal court jurisdiction are identical in both the appropriations and authorizations context. Moreover, like authorizations, appropriations must comport with the Constitution and not impede the execution of final judgments. Finally, as the impoundment cases demonstrate, Congress is empowered to set policy through appropriations. 
III. INTERPRETING LIMITATION RIDERS
A. The Authorizations/Appropriations Dilemma.
Since the Constitution does not distinguish appropriations from authorizations, 166 there is no doubt that appropriations bills can establish, amend or repeal federal programs and priorities. 167 Yet, appropriations generally do not contain clear policy statements. Instead, courts are faced with the dilemma of determining whether appropriations should be viewed as amendments to related authorizations. On this score, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have sent out inconsistent messages.
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the distinction between authorizations and appropriations. 168 In Andrus v. Sierra Club, 169 for example, the Court held that appropriations requests should not be considered proposals for legislation 170 and concluded that appropriations were not subject to the statutory requirement that environmental impact statements accompany "proposals for legislation." 171 186 an enlisted member of the United States Army challenged the constitutional basis for American military intervention in Vietnam, seeking an injunction that would have prevented him from having to go there. The legal argument-supported by several scholars serving as expert witnesses 187 -was that the various appropriations did not constitute declarations of policy. Thus, the President was carrying on a war without congressional approval-in violation of the Constitution. 188 The district court rejected this claim and held that powers can be conferred on the President by appropriations acts. 189 The court held that procedural rules of the House of Representatives and Senate that were designed to prevent declarations of policy in appropriations bills were not of constitutional significance. 190 The court observed:
That some members of Congress talked like doves before voting with the hawks is an inadequate basis for a charge that the President was violating the Constitution in doing what Congress by its words had told him he might do. . . . The entire course of legislation shows that Congress knew what it was doh1g, and that it intended to have American troops fight in Vietnam. 1 9 1 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:456 In Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 192 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pointed to Berk when it rejected efforts by members of the House of Representatives to halt American bombing in IndoChina. The court of appeals-noting that Congress had appropriated funds for these bombings-rejected the plaintiffs' charge that the President had improperly initiated a basic change in the war without first seeking legislative approval. 193 Specifically, the court used floor statements as evidence of Congress's awareness of the consequences of its appropriations decision and equated such funding with legislative authorization of the Indo-China campaign. 1 9 4
In Mitchell v. Laird, 195 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached a different conclusion. In Mitchell, thirteen members of the House of Representatives sought an injunction to prevent the !'resident from pressing war in Indo-China without congressional authorization. Although the court refused to decide the case because it felt the issues were really political questions and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, 1 9 6 it did expressly recognize that congressional appropriations were not the equivalent of congressional authorizations. Disagreeing with Berk, the court contended that:
[I]n voting to appropriate money or to draft men a Congressman is not necessarily approving of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically the appropriation or draft act refers to that war. A Congressman wholly opposed to the war's commencement and continuation might vote for the military appropriations and for the draft measures because he was unwilling to abandon without support men already fighting .... We should not construe votes cast in pity and piety as though they were votes freely given to express consent. 1 9 7
Atlee v. Laird, 198 a 1972 three-judge district court decision, also held that votes on appropriations are an unreliable measure of legislative intent. The court in Atlee noted that "it would be impossible to gather and evaluate properly the information necessary for deciding whether Congress [through its appropriation of funds] meant to authorize the military activities in Vietnam," and concluded that it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to involve itself in this matter. 1 99 Such involvement-forcing Congress to abide by court-formulated rules-might impinge on the legislature's constitutionally designated function to declare war. 200 2. Abortion Funding. Hyde anti-abortion riders have also been the subject of several court decisions. Court cases involving the Hyde amendments have addressed the question of whether these riders have, by implication, amended provisions of the Social Security Act that govern the Medicaid program. Under the Medicaid Act, federal funds are made available to states willing to comply with regulations governing medical services to the needy. 201 In the absence of Hyde riders, participating states could not limit abortion services to either life-threatening circumstances or pregnancies resulting from rape. 202 With the limitation of federal funds to such categories, 203 however, several states claimed that they were no longer generally obligated to provide abortions to the needy. 204 These states argued that the Hyde riders modified their responsibilities under the Medicaid Act.
The judiciary's resolution of this issue bespeaks the confusion over appropriations-based policymaking. On one hand, since the Hyde riders affect only federal funding of abortion, there is no reason to think that they affect the obligation of states to provide funds for abortions under the Medicaid Act. 205 On the other hand, the propensity of some courts to downplay the appropriations/authorizations distinction by immersing themselves in legislative history might lead to a quite different outcome. Court decisions support this view: courts that emphasize legislative history view the Hyde limitation riders as substantive amendments to the Medicaid Act; courts that place greater weight on the appropriations/ authorizations distinction limit the Hyde amendments' effects to federal funding of abortions.
Appellate courts in the First, 20 6 Third, 207 Seventh, 208 and Eighth 20 9 Circuits held that the Hyde riders modified the Medicaid Act. Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis 210 typifies these cases. In Preterm, the United States DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:456 Court of Appeals for the First Circuit first considered the prospect of exclusive state financing of abortions. The court claimed that the Medicaid Act ensures federal assistance in the provision of specified medical services and concluded that exclusive state financing is "a result not consonant with the basic policy of the Medicaid system." 211 The court then turned to the legislative history of the Hyde amendments and found "that Congress [was acutely conscious] that it was using the unusual and frowned upon device of legislating via an appropriations measure to accomplish a substantive result." 212 The court concluded that Congress modified the states' obligations under the Medicaid Act by excluding the states' responsibility to fund abortion services. 21 3 To support this assessment, the Preterm court pointed to numerous statements in the legislative debates. 214 Among those statements is Congressman Stokes' characterization of the rider as "tantamount to a constitutional amendment outlawing abortions for the poor" 215 and Senator Packwood's admonition that "[i]f we do not fund abortions, these 250,000 to 300,000 women who now receive abortions, paid for by Federal or State moneys under medicaid, are either going to have babies they do not want or are going to go to backroom abortionists." 216 The court also found significant the total absence of discussion suggesting that states would assume the burden of paying for abortions. 217 The court, however, did not consider probative Congressman Dornan's statement that such an amendment "simply denies Federal funds," 218 Congressman Edwards' observation that "the only thing over which we have any control is what we do with Federal dollars," 219 or other similar statements. 220 In contrast to Preterm, several district courts have concluded that the plain language of the Hyde riders only addresses the federal government's role in funding abmtions. 221 Emphasizing the "recognized and settled policy of Congress against legislating in an appropriations context," the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, in Doe v. Busbee, 222 concluded that the plain language of the Hyde amendmentsif clear-should be put into effect without resort to legislative history. 223 The court also criticized Preterm for ignoring the fact that rider sponsors were unable to enact legislation that would "change substantive law on abortions." 224 The court characterized Preterm's analysis of the Hyde amendments' legislative history as an effort to "make { ] self-fulfilling prophecies" of the amendments sponsors' efforts to stop public funding of abortions. 225 Like court challenges to the Vietnam War, court interpretations of the Hyde riders reflect the split over whether substantive effect should be given to appropriations legislation. This division, most likely, will continue. 226. In resolving whether the Hyde riders and related state legislation were constitutional, the Supreme Court avoided the issue of whether the Hyde amendments should be reviewed as substantive legislation or as money bills. In Harris v. McRae, the Court held that the Medicaid Act itself "provides for variations in the required coverage of state Medicaid plans depending on changes in the availability of federal reimbursement, we need [therefore] not inquire ... whether the Hyde Amendment is a substantive amendment to [the Act]." 448 U.S. 297, 310 n.14 (1980). In other words, Harris ruled that, by its own terms, the Medicaid Act-because it emphasizes cooperative federal-state funding-"does not obligate a participating State to pay for those medical services for which federal reimbursement is unavailable." Id. at 309. For an identical holding, see Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 369 (1980) . The Court's reasoning in Harris is spurious. Granted, Medicaid is a cooperatively funded program. But the terms of voluntary state participation are not defined by specific levels of federal funding; instead, the Medicaid Act specifies a list of demands with which states must comply to receive available federal.funds. If these Act-specified demands are perceived as too costly, states may either opt out of the program or modify the types of care provided in a nondiscriminatory manner. Consequently, since the Hyde riders did not specifically amend (or even refer to) the Medicaid Act, states providing some abortion services should be required to fund all therapeutic abortions. If Congress is dissatisfied with this outcome, it should explicitly amend the Medicaid Act. DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:456 
B. Resolving the Conflict: Toward an Understanding of Limitation Riders Governing Internal Revenue Service Nondiscrimination Standards.
From 1979 to 1981, Congress enacted limitation riders governing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement of nondiscrimination requirements. Federal courts, on at least three occasions, were called upon to consider the significance of these riders. These decisions provide an excellent point of reference for understanding the benefits and pitfalls of viewing such riders as substantive legislative amendments. As is shown below, Congress's purpose varied each of the four years these riders were enacted. Such variance demonstrates the indeterminacy of legislative intent in this area and, with it, the perils of viewing limitation riders as substantive enactments. 296 (1978) . These procedures would have denied tax-exempt status to private schools that (I) had been found by a court or agency to be racially discriminatory or (2) had an insignificant number of minority students and were formed or substantially expanded at or about the time of the desegregation of the public schools in the community. Id. at 37,296-97. The Service proposed to utilize a numerically based definition of significant minority enrollment: a school would be nonreviewable as a potential discriminator if at least 20 percent of school-age minorities of the community were enrolled in the school. This legislation, enacted in the summer of 1979, initially served as a stop-gap measure designed to prevent the IRS from implementing its announced rule change. Shortly before the passage of these riders, the House Appropriations Committee in its report of the 1980 Appropriations Act expressed concern over the IRS's proposed initiatives:
The issue of tax exempt status of private schools is a matter of far reaching social significance and the Service ought to issue revenue procedures in this area only when the legislative intent is fairly explicit. The Appropriations Committee is unsure that the proposed revenue procedures ... are the proper expression of that legislative intent. The Committee believes that the Service ought not issue these revenue procedures until the appropriate legislative committees have had a chance to evaluate them .... 232 Congressmen Ashbrook and Dornan echoed these concerns when they introduced their riders. Congressman Ashbrook claimed that the IRS "confuse[ d) its own role as tax collector with that of legislator, jurist, or policymaker." 233 Congressman Dornan characterized the IRS proposal as a "unilateral usurp[ation of] Congress's constitutional authority to define tax policy." 234 Moreover, although congressional debate on these riders did consider the appropriateness of the IRS procedures, 235 rider sponsors did not claim that they were amending the tax code; instead, they argued that they were "just saying do not go for- 235. Witness the following colloquy: on the House side, Representative Mitchell asked Representative Dornan whether his amendment would "give tax-exempt status to those schools that were deliberately set up to avoid any form of desegregation." I d. To this, Dornan replied, "that the way DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:456 ward with these [IRS procedures] ... until the Congress or a court affirmatively acts on that subject."2 36
In November 1979 and May 1980, the District Court for the District of Columbia considered the possible impact of these riders on the Code's tax-exemption provision. The first case, Wright v. Miller, 237 involved efforts by a nationwide class of black students and their parents to force the IRS to adopt standards similar to those proposed by the Carter administration. The district court rejected these efforts because it felt that the Ashbrook and Doman amendments functioned as substantive legislation, precluding judicial intervention. 238 According to the district court, these riders were "the strongest possible expression of the Congressional intent" and a "complete and total refutation of [ • is not to play mischief with every decent religious organization around the country that has a school set up for good purposes." Id.
On the Senate side, the chief antagonists were Senator Javits and Senator Helms. For Senator Javits, absent an adequate and well-defined enforcement procedure "these segregated academies will continue to flourish with taxpayer assistance." I d. at 22,907. Senator Helms countered by claiming that the "people who have built these schools ... are interested in ... education ... not race. For the IRS to step in and arbitrarily say 'Because you do not have x numbers of whatever race enrolled in this school, your tax exemption is eliminated,' is tyranny." Id.
Despite this recognition, neither House nor Senate debates suggest that Congress intended to affirmatively amend the Code through these riders. In fact, House and Senate parliamentarians both refused to sustain points of order that these riders were impermissible legislation on an appropriations bill. 242. The court characterized as presumptively discriminatory Mississippi private schools that {1) had been adjudged to be racially discriminatory or {2) were established or expanded at the time Wright and Green, while reaching opposite conclusions, both misconstrued the meaning and effect of the Ashbrook and Dornan riders. Wright's holding that these riders somehow permanently amended the tax code is erroneous. Granted, Congress was displeased with the IRS proposal; the riders' chief purpose, however, simply was to prevent such IRS activity while Congress considered its options. 243 At the other extreme, Green errs by ordering the IRS to implement Carter-like standards in Mississippi-even though the As~brook and Dornan riders were in effect. Congress, by denying the IRS funds to implement the Carter proposal, prevented the Service from using the proposed procedure during FY 1980. As demonstrated earlier, congressional authorization of a specific enforcement scheme does not mean that Congress must appropriate funds to put that scheme into place. 244 Green, therefore, should have accorded the 1980 appropriations bill respect equivalent that given to other legislative enactments. 243. Moreover, since the Wright action was based on statutory and constitutional prohibitions of federal funding of racial discrimination, the Wright court sub silentio viewed these riders as both an amendment to federal antidiscrimination Jaws and a restriction on federal court jurisdiction. No statement in the legislative debates remotely suggests such an expansive reading of these riders. [Vol. 1987:456 appropriations powers-thinly disguised as a court order-should be rejected by this body .... 247 At the same time, supporters of these riders did not seek to nullify Green, for they claimed that the IRS was still bound to follow court orders. 248 Another distinction to the legislation in 1979 was that congressional sponsors considered the 1980 measures an alternative to legislation, not a stop-gap measure permitting further study on the issue. Congressman Ashbrook, explaining why he introduced his rider rather than support the enactment of an amendment to the Code, stated that "the appropriations process offers us the only practical way to resist the Internal Revenue Service's direct assault on private and religious schools." 24 9 Despite the raising of points of order,2 50 the recognition that-under GreenMississippi might have different nondiscrimination enforcement standards than the rest of the nation, 251 and complaints that the appropriations process should not be used to circumvent "things which the courts have directed that the executive branch should have the constitutional responsibility to carry out, " 252 virtually identical versions of the Ashbrook and Dornan riders were enacted into law. 25 viewed these amendments as substantive legislation. First, rather than viewing them as a temporary stop-gap measure, the sponsors of these amendments considered the appropriations forum the only available route to enact such substantive limitations on the IRS. Second, Congress's overwhelming approval2 54 of these measures in the face of Green suggests that Congress intended to exercise its legislative authority to prevent both the administration and the courts from initiating rigid enforcement standards. Third, Congress recognized both the effect of its decision and the fact that it used the disfavored technique of legislating on an appropriations measure.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, when reviewing the district court decision in Wright v. Miller, concluded that these riders should be read as no more "than a temporary stop order on IRS initiatives." 255 The appellate court focused its attention on floor debates surrounding the initial enactment of the Ashbrook and Dornan riders. 256 The court was virtually silent with respect to the 1980 reenactment of these measures, noting in a footnote that Congress did not intend to disrupt court orders. 257 This reading is woefully inadequate, for Congress-while recognizing the force of Green-clearly intended to prevent judicial usurpation of its lawmaking authority. Moreover, unlike its initial enactment of these measures, Congress viewed its 1980 reenactment as an alternative to authorizing legislation. Because the court of appeals did not recognize that Congress sought to accomplish different objectives in 1980 than it did in 1979, it misinterpreted the Ashbrook and Dornan riders. 25 8 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:456 enforcement of court orders that required stricter nondiscrimination enforcement standards than those in place at the time of the Carter IRS proposal.2 59 Congressman Ashbrook explained the rider as a proposal to oppose "this judicial power-grab ... by the fundamental building block of our system of representative government: The power of the purse. " 2 60 Congressman Dornan was equally critical of the courts. For him, "under the guise of interpreting 'public policy,' [the courts] have, in fact, been acting totally contrary to law and public policy by usurping Congress' constitutional authority to define the tax policy of this Nation." 261 Proponents of the 1981 rider did not, however, intend to make Green v. Miller unenforceable. Rather, rider sponsors claimed that judiciallymandated procedures ordered in Green must be respected, but that "this cancer should not spread to the other 49 States" as a result of the Wright decision. 262 This action represents as clear a statement as Congress can makethrough the appropriations process-that it disapproved of the expansive nondiscrimination enforcement standards proposed by the Carter IRS. Indeed, when this limitation was extended in 1981, there was no threat of IRS encroachment on this matter. 263 Moreover, sensing that the courts, not the Executive, would be the likely source of such requirements, Congress took the unprecedented step of severely limiting judicial authority. The 1981 enactment therefore raises significant issues regarding both congressional preclusion of judicial review and the force and effect of Wright v. Regan.
1982 Proposal.
In January 1982, President Reagan concluded that the IRS was without statutory authority to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. 264 Immediately following this
LIMITATION RIDERS
495
reversal of the long-standing IRS policy, the administration became the object of a barrage of criticism from the news media 265 and civil rights groups. 266 Against the backdrop of this activity, the Supreme Court was preparing to hear Bob Jones University v. United States. 267 This case, involving a challenge by a racially discriminatory religious university whose tax-exempt status was denied several years earlier, squarely raised the statutory issue that was the basis of the Reagan IRS's policy directive: whether the IRS's denial of tax-exempt status to discriminatory educational institutions was permissible under the Internal Revenue Code. 268 The Supreme Court's willingness to resolve this issue figured prominently in subsequent deliberations over the Ashbrook-Doman riders. 269 Congressman Doman 270 reintroduced the riders, arguing that "as a result of [Wright] , the way has been paved for a possible ruling ... which would implement significant parts of the ... procedures forbidden by my amendment." 271 Notwithstanding that Congressman Doman's words were no less valid in 1982 than they were in the three prior years in DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:456 which his amendment was passed,2 72 the House of Representatives declined to reenact the measure. 273 Pointing to the pendency of Bob Jones University, the tax-exemption issue was perceived to be beyond the scope of legislative power. Representative Rangel, for example, argued that "this very sensitive constitutional question is presently before the U.S. Supreme Court [and members of Congress who want to enact the Dornan amendment], are extending this question beyond the scope of this Congress." 274 This explanation is utter nonsense. A question of statutory interpretation was at issue in Bob Jones University. Congress would have been more than justified to clarify its understanding of the Code's tax-exemption provision. Moreover, Bob Jones University's concern was the threshold issue of whether discriminatory private schools were entitled to taxexempt status. The Ashbrook-Dornan riders never questioned the propriety of a nondiscrimination requirement.2 75 Instead, the sole purpose of those riders was to foreclose one type of nondiscrimination enforcement scheme. Finally, by this time, the underlying purpose of AshbrookDornan was to curtail judicial action of the kind in Wright. 2 7 6
Congress's stated reasoning therefore is better understood as a subterfuge to Congress's true motivation. 277 In November 1982, when this matter was under consideration, the private school tax exemption issue had become a major embarassment to the Reagan administration. Consequently, had Congress reenacted the riders, it would have appeared to have aligned itself with the administration-even though the AshbrookDornan riders, rather than extend tax-exempt status to all private schools, merely sought to prevent the imposition of quota-like enforcement standards.
It is next to impossible to discern what Congress intended by not acting on these riders. On one hand, there is no reason to think that congressional opposition to the Carter proposal had dissipated. On the other hand, by deferring to the courts, Congress conceded the possible adoption of Carter-like standards in the Wright litigation. Such an approach might displease Congress, however, for Congress often intends to accomplish policy objectives through appropriations. 296 Congress itself can remedy the situation through the enactment of substantive legislation. Perhaps Congress has forgotten that authorizing legislation is the most effective form of oversight. Or perhaps Congress has grown accustomed to judicial acquiescence to back-door legislation. These reasons for giving substantive effect to appropriations, however, ignore the problems of interpretation encountered by the courts and the effects that misinterpretation is likely to produce. Viewing appropriations as single-year enactments is much less likely to create these problems, even if the courts, in so interpreting appropriations, do not give full effect to legislative intent.
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this article has been to discuss the frequency of appropriations-based oversight and legal issues associated with such oversight. In doing so, this article has been critical both of the use of appropriations as an alternative to substantive legislation and of the v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 706 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Noting that the Constitution entrusts the war declaration power to Congress, the court in At lee concluded that judicial involvement in this matter would violate the political question doctrine. ld. This political question ruling comports with the view that judicial power should not be exercised over matters that the Constitution has committed to another branch of government. See courts' willingness to view single-year appropriations as enduring policy directives. This article, however, should not be viewed as an absolute condemnation of the practice of attaching legislation to an appropriations bill. When Congress must respond to an emergency, such as the Vietnam War, short-term appropriations-based oversight seems sensible. Furthermore, if the appropriations process is the only available vehicle to enact legislation, Congress might be better served by enacting flawed legislation than no legislation. There are, however, significant risks associated with this practice. While growing concerns over the budget deficit strongly suggest the increasing confluence of fiscal and substantive policy, it is hoped that this article will make Congress more sensitive to the implications of appropriations-based oversight with respect to the administration of laws and the adjudication of claims arising under them.
